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Abstract. This paper reviews one nonlinear and two linear projection 
architectures, in the context of a comparative study, which are used as either 
alternative or complementary tools in the identification and analysis of 
anomalous situations by Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs). Three neural 
projection models are empirically compared, using real traffic data sets in an 
IDS framework. The specific multivariate data analysis techniques that drive 
these models are able to identify different factors or components by studying 
higher order statistics - variance and kurtosis - in order to display the most 
interesting projections or dimensions. Our research describes how a network 
manager is able to diagnose anomalous behaviour in data traffic through visual 
projection of network traffic. We also emphasize the importance of the time-
dependent variable in the application of these projection methods. 
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1   Introduction 
An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is designed to monitor computer systems or 
network events and to detect undesired and unauthorised entries, mainly via the 
internet. An IDS has become a necessary additional tool to the security infrastructure 
of a computer system as network attacks have risen dramatically over recent years. 
Our research addresses the use of projection methods as either an alternative or a 
complementary tool that allows the network administrator to visualize traffic data 
patterns. In complex clustering domains, some data sets may hide their own 
structures. Projection models [1] are used as tools to identify and remove correlations 
between problem variables, which enables us to carry out dimensionality reduction, 
visualization or exploratory data analysis. These tools search for interesting 
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projections or dimensions based on the analysis of different statistical features, such 
as Principal Component Analysis (PCA) [2], [3] and Exploratory Projection Pursuit 
(EPP) [1], [4], among others. 
The projection system that we propose exploits projection models to arrive at a 
compact visualization of traffic evolution. The resulting IDS is designed to assist the 
network manager by providing an effective visual tool to detect anomalous situations 
based on the identification of high temporal distributions of the packets, moving in 
non-parallel or unorthodox directions to the normal ones. One of the main benefits of 
these neural network-based models is their ability to identify new attacks, known as 
“day-0 attacks”, without updating the IDS. 
This paper reports a review of one nonlinear and two linear neural projection 
models that can all be effectively applied to an IDS, which is followed by a 
comparative study of their respective performances. Following this introduction, 
section 2 goes on to introduce the projection models under examination; section 3 
describes the data sets used in the experiments; and, finally, section 4 discusses the 
results, puts forward a number of conclusions and pointers for future work. 
2   Unsupervised Neural Projection Models 
Several attempts have been made to apply Neural Architectures (such as Self-
Organising Maps [5], [6] Multilayer Perceptron [7], Radial Basis Function Networks 
[8]) to the field of network security [9], [10]. Most of them have focused on a 
classificatory approach to the intrusion detection task. A different approach is 
followed in this research, in which the main goal is to provide the network 
administrator with a snapshot of the network traffic, not only to detect anomalous 
situations but also to visualize protocol interactions and traffic volume. Three 
different models dealing with this issue are applied and their performance has been 
compared.  
Unsupervised learning was chosen for this research, because in a real-life situation 
there is no target reference with which to compare the response of the network. The 
use of this kind of learning is very appropriate, for instance in the case of identifying 
“day-0 attacks”. 
2.1   Principal Component Analysis  
PCA originated in work by Pearson [2], and independently by Hotelling [3] to 
describe the multivariate data set variations in terms of uncorrelated variables each of 
which is a linear combination of the original variables. Its main goal is to derive new 
variables, in decreasing order of importance, that are linear combinations of the 
original variables and are uncorrelated with each other. It is a well-known technique, 
and it can be implemented by a number of connectionist models [11], [12].  
2.2   Neural Implementation of Exploratory Projection Pursuit 
The standard statistical method of EPP [1] also provides a linear projection of a data 
set, but it projects the data onto a set of basis vectors which best reveal the interesting 
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structure in data; interestingness is usually defined in terms of how far the distribution 
is from the Gaussian distribution.  
One neural implementation of EPP is Maximum Likelihood Hebbian Learning 
(MLHL) [4], [13]. It identifies interestingness by maximising the probability of the 
residuals under specific probability density functions which are non-Gaussian. 
One extended version of this model is the Cooperative Maximum Likelihood 
Hebbian Learning (CMLHL) [14] model. CMLHL is based on MLHL [4], [13] 
adding lateral connections [14], [15] which have been derived from the Rectified 
Gaussian Distribution [16]. The resultant net can find the independent factors of a 
data set but does so in a way that captures some type of global ordering in the data set. 
Considering an N-dimensional input vector ( x ), and an M-dimensional output 
vector ( y ), with ijW being the weight (linking input j  to output i ), then CMLHL 
can be expressed [14], [15] as:  
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Where: η  is the learning rate, τ is the "strength" of the lateral connections, b  the 
bias parameter, p a parameter related to the energy function [4], [13], [14] and A  a 
symmetric matrix used to modify the response to the data [14]. The effect of this 
matrix is based on the relation between the distances separating the output neurons. 
2.3   Nonlinear Principal Component Analysis 
Nonlinear Principal Component Analysis (NLPCA) [17] was designed to circumvent 
the limitations of linearity inherent in the PCA model. NLPCA is based on an auto-
associative neural network and employs a Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP) structure, 
which belongs to the feedforward class of neural networks [18].  
The conventional MLP model implements a stimulus-response behaviour by 
combining several layers of elementary units (‘neurons’). Each unit involves a simple, 
nonlinear transformation of weighted inputs; theoretical proof is available that 
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feedforward networks embedding a sigmoidal nonlinearity support arbitrary mappings 
[19], [20]. A conventional MLP includes three layers (input, ‘hidden’ and output), and 
associates an input vector, x∈ℜD, with an output vector, y∈ℜQ, computed as: 
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where, Nh is the depth of the sigmoid series expansion, and W represents the 
coefficients of the weights for the interconnections between the two upper layers. An 
empirical fitting process tunes the weights, W, so that the network best reproduces the 
desired (x, y) mapping over a given training set. The classical cost function measuring 
the mapping distortion is the mean square error, EW, between the desired response (or 
‘target’), for a given input vector and the actual network output. Thus, the network-
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where t(s) is the desired output for the s-th training vector, x(s), and n is the number of 
training pairs (x(s), t(s)). In practice, the learning problem (6) is tackled efficiently and 
effectively by the Back-Propagation (BP) algorithm [18], which uses a stochastic 
gradient-descent strategy over the weight space.  
Auto-Associative BP (AABP) networks constitute an unsupervised variant of the 
general MLP model, in which the desired outputs coincide with the network inputs: t 
≡ x. The aim is a reduction in dimensionality by forcing the network to replicate the 
training sample distribution in this way, as the hidden layer is typically smaller than 
the input/output ones. At run-time, an AABP network associates each input vector 
with the ‘coding’ values computed by the hidden neurons; these mapping outputs 
support the (lossy) transformation from the input space into a lower-dimensional 
representation. A three-layer AABP network implements a mapping that is, in fact, 
affine to PCA. As such, the resultant mapping can suffer from the same drawbacks 
that affect PCA-like representations, such as a remarkable sensitivity to outliers in the 
training set. Hence, the NLPCA architecture (Fig. 1) that involved a sophisticated 
AABP model was proposed to tackle this issue.  
As with conventional three-layer AABP, the output layer imposes the input values 
as targets and a hidden layer continues to support dimensionality reduction. The 
crucial difference with regard to the conventional AABP lies in the compression and 
reconstruction sections, each of which include an additional layer of neurons, whence 
the five-layer network. The NLPCA architecture retains the universal approximation 
ability of BP networks [17], and still adheres to the principle of unsupervised training. 
The run-time use of the resulting network, after completion of training, is equivalent 
to the use of a three-layer AABP structure, as the mapping outputs of the middle 
‘coding’ layer provide the low-dimensional representation of each input vector. 
Moreover, this increased power of representation conveyed by the NLPCA 
augmentation is remarkable. The problem is, of course, that nobody knows the Nh 
target values in advance that should be imposed on the lower section of the network 
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for learning the compression task. In the NLPCA approach, those target values are 
implicitly imposed by forcing the network to reconstruct the original sample in the 
upper section. Thus, the ‘reconstruction’ section and the compression section will 
always be symmetrical and will therefore always yield equivalent, universal (inverse) 
mapping capabilities. 
The main advantage is that the compressed representation does not relate to any 
linear model (as in PCA), but stems instead from a mainly general, internal 
representation that is empirically learned. NLPCA techniques seem to fit those 
domains in which 1) a nonlinear representation best encompasses the observed 
empirical phenomenon, and at the same time, 2) a considerable number of empirical 
samples are available. 
 
Fig. 1. A Nonlinear AABP network includes five layers to reduce data dimensionality 
2.4   A General Architecture for an Intrusion Detection System 
The projection models described above could work embedded in an IDS, performing 
a data analysis step, in an architecture akin to the MObile VIsualization Connectionist 
Agent-Based IDS (MOVICAB-IDS) [21], [22]. It has also been shown that this 
general architecture can be improved by the inclusion of the multiagent paradigm. 
3   Real Data Set 
In this work, the above mentioned neural models have been applied to a real traffic 
data set [22] containing normal traffic and anomalous situations. These anomalous 
situations are related to Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP), known for 
its vulnerabilities [23]. The data set includes: SNMP ports sweeps (scanning of 
network computers for different ports - a random port number: 3750, and SNMP 
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default port numbers: 161 and 162 - using sniffing methods), and a Management 
Information Base (MIB) - the SNMP database - information transfer. 
The used data set contains only five variables extracted from the packet headers: 
timestamp (the time when the packet was sent), protocol, source port (the port of the 
source host that sent the packet), destination port (the destination host port number to 
which the packet is sent) and size: (total packet size in Bytes). This ‘made-to-
measure’ data set was generated by the research team in a medium-sized network 
such that the “normal” and anomalous traffic flows were known in advance.  
Emphasizing the importance of the time-dependence variable is one of the aims of 
this work. In line with this idea, 2 different data set variations (inclusion or exclusion 
of time information) were used. 
4   Results and Conclusions 
In this work, we have compared the performance of the three projection models 
(PCA, CMLHL and NLPCA) under review in order to analyse their response to the 
data set described above.  










Fig. 2. NLPCA projection against time Fig. 3. CMLHL projection 
In Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, we can see how the NLPCA and the CMLHL model are both 
able to identify the two anomalous situations contained in the data set. The MIB 
information transfer (Groups A and B in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3) is identified due to its 
orthogonal direction with respect to the normal traffic (vertical and parallel straight 
lines) and to the high density of packets. The sweeps (Groups C, D and E in Fig. 2 
and Fig. 3) are identified due to their non-parallel direction to the normal one. 
The results shown in Fig. 2 were obtained by using only four variables (excluding 
time information) for training the NLPCA network and plotting the 2-D projection  
(X, Y) against time. In contrast, the results on the CMLHL network (Fig. 3) were 
obtained by using the five variables to obtain a 3-D projection (X, Y and Z). This 
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outcome shows the intrinsic robustness of CMLHL, which is able to respond properly 
to a complex data set that includes time as a variable.  
Finally, PCA was applied to the problem, firstly by including time information as a 
variable (Fig. 4), and then by excluding time information and plotting the two 
principal components against time (Fig. 5). 
PCA was only able to identify the port sweeps (Group A in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5). As 
may be seen, it failed to detect the MIB information transfer because the packets in 
this anomalous situation evolve in a direction parallel to the “normal” one.  
Group A Group A 
 
Fig. 4. The three first principal components Fig. 5. The two first principal components 
against time 
In conclusion, our work upholds the view that projection methods are an 
interesting and powerful tool in the identification of anomalous situations through 
visualization. A network administrator can easily identify a network scan represented 
by its evolution along a non-parallel direction to the normal one while an MIB 
transfer is characterized by its high packet density and its orthogonal direction with 
respect to the normal traffic. Another interesting issue is the capability of CMLHL to 
process time information as one of the data variables. In contrast, the NL-PCA 
network can not deal with the time variable, even though it obtains similar results to 
CMLHL by plotting its results against time, as shown in Fig. 2. 
These two models outperform PCA, as the latter is unable to identify one of the 
anomalous situations: the MIB information transfer (including and excluding time 
infomation), while it always identifies the port sweeps. 
Further work will focus on the application of high-performance computing 
clusters. Increased system power will be used to enable the IDS to process and display 
the traffic data in real time.  
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